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Abstract
This paper analyzes the incentive eﬀects of pollution taxes versus pol-
lution permits for a revenue maximizing Government that also pursues
environmental objectives. In our model, pollution permits are analyzed as
durable goods, and the leasing of pollution permits is seen as an equivalent
to a pollution tax. We show that environmental policy based on durable
pollution permits can be welfare superior to a pollution tax regime. The
intuition is that a monopolistic Government would, in order to maximize
its revenues, try to restrict the permit sales below the welfare maximizing
level.
While a pollution tax or leasing charge allows the Government to cred-
ibly commit to a monopoly level of pollution in future periods, a system
based on durable permits weakens the monopolistic Government’s ability
to credibly restrict future sales. Therefore, a pollution tax regime may
be better for the environment and simultaneously increase Government
revenues, but social welfare is larger with pollution permits.
Hence, a regime where the Government cannot commit to monopoly
quantities may be preferable from a welfare economic perspective. This
argument in favor of durable permits complements more traditional argu-
ments based on information asymmetries and innovation incentives.
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How to combat global warming is one of the most vigorously debated issues of
environmental policy today. Among economists, much of the discussion in this
area has circled around the question which policy instruments are best suited
to achieve greenhouse emission objectives eﬃciently. There appears to be some
agreement that, in general, a regime based on tradable emissions permits is
preferable to a pollution tax system (see, e.g., Tietenberg, 1985). The main
argument in favor of tradable emission permits is that they ensure that pollution
is reduced where it is least costly. Tradable permits, therefore, rank relatively
highly in terms of allocative (and productive) eﬃciency. Furthermore, permits
have also been argued to lead to relatively high degrees of dynamic eﬃciency, as
they carry relatively strong incentives for innovation regarding clean products
and technologies (see Jung, Krutilla and Boyd, 1996). This view, however, has
recently been challenged by Requate and Unold (1997) who show that in their
model permits do never provide higher incentives to adopt advanced abatement
technologies.1
While the incentives that permits and taxes carry for polluting ﬁrms are reason-
ably well understood today, there has been comparatively little analysis of the
incentives the two diﬀerent policy instruments carry for policy makers. There
is some normative analysis of Governments’ optimal policy choice, given cer-
tain environmental objectives, but this literature provides no further insights
regarding the incentives diﬀerent policy instruments contain for policy makers.2
An exception is the paper by Boyer and Laﬀont (1999) who focus on the emer-
gence of sophisticated market-based or incentive mechanisms of environmental
regulation in a model where politicians pursue the private agendas of their
electoral base. Furthermore, there are a few papers which explicitly address
policy makers’ incentives to introduce pollution taxes only, analyzing the polit-
ical economy of ecological taxation schemes from a positive point of view (see,
e.g., Fredriksson, 1997; Gawel and Schneider, 1997).
Our paper adds another aspect to this stream of work, as its focus is on the cred-
ibility aspects associated with pollution taxes versus emissions permits. More
speciﬁcally, we ask what policy instruments diﬀerent types of Government are
1Further papers focussing on the dynamic eﬃciency aspects of diﬀerent regulatory ap-
proaches are Milliman and Prince (1989), Requate (1995), Gersbach and Glazer (1996), Laf-
font and Tirole (1996) and Denicolo (1999). While Milliman and Prince (1989), Requate
(1995) and Gersbach and Glazer (1996) all argue in favor of permits to induce ﬁrms to in-
vest in new abatement technologies, Denicolo (1999) obtains the opposite result, namely that
taxes carry higher incentives to invest in pollution reducing technologies. Similarly, Laﬀont
and Tirole (1996) show that permits may actually induce over-investment. They argue for an
approach based on pollution options which lead to superior welfare results in their model.
Another diﬀerence between permits and taxes is the ﬁnancial impact on the regulated indus-
try: Permits, once issued, leave the average cash ﬂow unaﬀected, whereas taxes persistently
extract money from the industry (see Dewees, 1998, 598).
2For example, Dewees (1998) points out that Governments should prefer permits over taxes
if they have certain quantity objectives because permits implement certain quantities of pol-
lution reduction (but at an uncertain price), whereas pollution taxes can, at best, implement
certain prices, but not certain quantities or quantity reductions.
1likely to prefer and, given the Government’s incentives, how environmental pol-
icy should be designed.
Pollution permits can be viewed as durable goods sold by a monopoly supplier,
namely the Government. As we know from Coase (1972), a proﬁt maximizing
durable goods monopolist has incentives to put additional stock on the market
in every single period. While the monopolist maximizes its ﬁrst period proﬁt
by selling the monopoly quantity, its incentives in the second period are to
put more stock out on the market, on top of the quantity already sold in the
past. This carries through to any future period until the monopolist reaches
the point where the additional revenues from putting out more stock equal the
marginal costs of provision. If buyers are not myopic, however, they foresee
the monopolist’s incentives to put out more stock in the future, which in turn
makes them more reluctant to buy the durable good today. Put diﬀerently,
the monopolist faces a credibility problem - which prevents them from exerting
market power - if they cannot commit not to sell more stock in the future. In
the extreme case where buyers have no time preference the monopolist is only
left with selling the product at a price which equals marginal costs right from
the start.
A solution to the monopolist’s credibility problem can be leasing instead of sell-
ing the product. If the monopolist is allowed to lease out the durable good,
consumers only pay a leasing charge or royalty per period. This eliminates the
monopolist’s incentive to put out more stock in the future, as any deviation from
the monopoly quantity in any single period will only reduce proﬁts.3 Similar
incentives exist for a revenue maximizing Government which sells pollution per-
mits. As the revenues of today’s license sale will be sunk tomorrow, a revenue
maximizing Government is tempted to sell additional permits in period 2, and
then again in period 3 and so on.
Contrast this with a pollution tax system: Under the assumption that the
Government has set its revenue maximizing pollution tax rate in period 1, there
is nothing it can do in order to raise further revenues in period 2 but to charge the
same revenue maximizing tax rate again. The level of environmental pollution
remains at the same low (monopoly) level in both periods.
Starting from the idea that pollution taxes can be seen as a leasing solution to
preserve the monopoly power of a revenue-oriented Government, the following
model will analyze the eﬃciency characteristics of durable pollution permits
versus taxes and identify circumstances under which either policy instrument
is preferable from an eﬃciency point of view, given policy makers’ incentives.
The credibility problem may possibly also help to explain why Governments,
even if they could fairly be judged as revenue maximizers, have failed to gen-
erate positive revenues from durable pollution permits.4 In Germany, for ex-
3More elaborate analyses of the durable-goods monopoly are Stokey (1981), Bulow (1982),
Bagnoli, Salant and Swierzbinski (1989) and von der Fehr and K¨ uhn (1995).
4As Norregaard & Reppelin-Hill (2000, 9ﬀ.) state, tradable permits have not been a favored
policy tool for pollution control worldwide, with the exception of the United States. The vast
majority of countries currently favors taxes over permits.
2ample, pollution rights have traditionally been issued in the form of durable,
non-tradable permits granted by authorities for approved investment projects.
Nowadays, the German Government shows a tendency towards pollution taxes,
whereas tradable permits play virtually no role.
The idea that license-based regimes create time consistency or credibility prob-
lems for policy makers, be it regulatory agencies or Governments, is not entirely
new, since it has also been discussed by Biglaiser, Horowitz and Quiggin (1995)
and Laﬀont and Tirole (1996). However, both papers model time consistency
problems for a neoclassical benevolent despot-type Government when ﬁrms in-
vest in pollution-eliminating technologies. In contrast, we explore the incentives
for diﬀerent types of Government that not only have environmental concerns,
but also revenue objectives. Furthermore, we also explicitly compare a tax based
regime with a system where pollution permits are sold.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents and analyzes our
general model which allows us to compare durable permit sales and permit leases
or pollution taxes. In this more general approach, we will not distinguish yet
between diﬀerent types of Government, but simply assume that the Government
has both welfare and budget concerns in its objective function.
Section 3 analyzes four diﬀerent types of Government which are modeled as
special cases of the general model presented in section 2. We parameterize our
general model in order to derive the speciﬁc results for four diﬀerent types of
Government: a benevolent dictator, a pure Leviathan, a business-friendly, and
a green Government. Section 4 brieﬂy draws policy conclusions.
2 Pollution Permits as Durable Goods
2.1 Outline of the Model
Consider an industry which produces a good involving the emission of a ﬁxed
quantity of some harmful substance per unit of output. All ﬁrms in the industry
are symmetric, i.e. all ﬁrms employ the same production technology. Also
suppose that the Government, G, requires all producers to hold a pollution
permit for every unit of output, and that G is the monopoly supplier of these
emissions permits. Let us also assume that there are two periods in the game and
that emissions permits are valid for the entire two periods; i.e. they are durable
goods. In accordance with Coase (1972) we assume that the Government as the
monopoly seller cannot commit itself not to issue and sell additional permits in
period 2; i.e. the Government faces a time consistency or credibility problem.5
We assume that G determines the number of permits to be sold in both periods.
Firms are assumed to compete for these permits in Bertrand fashion. Hence, in
order to simplify the analysis let F represent the entire industry, where F, as
5The two-period model, drawing on Rasmusen (1991, 276ﬀ.), is suﬃcient to analyze our
idea. In a model with an inﬁnite time horizon, the eﬀects we analyze would be even stronger,
see Coase (1972).
3the buyer of pollution permits, has no market power. The timing of the game
then is as follows:
• G sets the number of permits to be sold in period 1, denoted as q1.
• F oﬀers a price per permit for this quantity, denoted as p1.
• First-period payoﬀs are realized.
• G sets the number of additional permits to be sold, denoted as q2.
• F oﬀers a price, p2, for any additional permits,
• Second-period payoﬀs are realized, and the game ends.
F’s payoﬀs are B1 −p1q1 +B2 −p2q2, where Bt denotes F’s total gross beneﬁt
in period t. The beneﬁt, Bt, is derived from F’s marginal utility function
R = R(qt), where qt is the number of permits that the industry holds in period
t. Hence, R gives the inverse industry demand function for pollution rights and
is assumed to be linear and given by
R(qt) = a − qt (1)
with a > 0.6 Thus, given quantity choices q1 and q2, F’s total gross beneﬁt in

















We assume that the the social costs of pollution are c per period per unit of
output, with a > c > 0. Thus, the total cost of pollution as C = (2q1 + q2)c.
The total revenues of the Government are denoted as T = T1 + T2, where
Tt = ptqt, and the net beneﬁts to the industry or to other permit buyers are
given by N = N1 + N2 with Nt = Bt − Tt,t ∈ {1;2}.7 The Government’s main
objective is to maximize its surplus from selling permits, but we assume that
the Government may also have environmental objectives and product market
concerns. Therefore, the Government’s payoﬀ is modeled by Π, with
Π = T + βN − γC (4)
6Our results can also be derived without limiting the the slope of this function to −1. Our
approach, however, simpliﬁes the exposition.
7Thus, B = N + T.
4where β ∈ [0,1] represents the intensity of the Government’s product market
interests, while γ ∈ [0,1] is the weighting factor for the Government’s environ-
mental concern.8 Let us denote as Πt the payoﬀ of G in period t. Social welfare,
denoted as W, is given by9
W = B − C = B1(q1) + B2(q1,q2) − (2q1 + q2)c. (5)
2.2 Optimal Sale of Durable Permits
Let us now solve the game by backward induction and ﬁrst analyze F’s optimal
choice of q2, given the previous choices of p1,q1 and p2. At the beginning of
period 2, the ﬁrms already own a number of q1 permits. If they purchase an
additional q2 permits, the allowed level of pollution or production in the second
period amounts to q1 + q2. Hence, F’s residual willingness to pay is
p2 = R(q1 + q2) = a − (q1 + q2), (6)
which is the eﬀective inverse demand function for additional permits in the
second period. This inverse demand function has a lower intercept than the
marginal utility function R(qt), but the same slope. We now derive the optimal




Π2 = p2q2 + β[B2(q1,q2) − p2q2] − γcq2 (7)
which yields the ﬁrst-order condition a−q1−γc
! = (2−β)q2. Hence, the optimal





a − q1 − γc
2 − β
. (8)





(1 − β)(a − q1) + γc
2 − β
. (9)
Now we turn to F’s willingness to pay at the beginning of period 1, given G’s
earlier choice of q1, and anticipating the later choices of p2 and q2. To buy a
permit in period 1 brings two diﬀerent beneﬁts for F: Firstly, the permit can
8Our results do not depend on the limitation of these parameters on values between zero
and one. This limitation only simpliﬁes the exposition.
9Note that W does not contain T as a separate ﬁgure, as T is included in the gross beneﬁts
generated on the product market.
10Recall that B2 depends on (q1 +q2), whereas T2 only refers to q2, the quantity purchased
in period 2.
11The index P henceforth stands for outcomes under the permit sales regime.
5be used and provides some beneﬁt in that very period, and secondly, it also
saves purchasing costs at the beginning of the next period if one already owns a
permit. Hence, in the ﬁrst period F’s maximum willingness to pay is the sum of
the current beneﬁt and the price in period 2, R(q1) + p2. If permits were more
expensive in period 1, ﬁrms would be better oﬀ waiting until the second period.
Using (9), the inverse demand in the ﬁrst period is
pP
1 (q1) = R(q1) + pP
2 (q1) =
(3 − 2β)(a − q1) + γc
2 − β
. (10)
Given q2(q1), p2(q1) and p1(q1), the last step of our analysis is to derive qP
1 , the
optimal amount of permits chosen by G at the very beginning of the game.
The Government knows that, due to the lack of commitment opportunities, it
will sell qP
2 (q1) at a price pP
2 (q1) in period 2. Furthermore, G knows that it can
sell permits at a price of pP
1 (q1) now. Thus, the Government chooses q1 so as
to solve the following maximization problem:
max
q1
T(q1,q2) + β[N1(q1) + N2(q1,q2)] − γ(2q1 + q2)c
with p1 = pP
1 (q1), p2 = pP
2 (q1) and q2 = qP
2 (q1). After rearranging,12 this yields
the following ﬁrst-order condition:
qP
1
! = (2 − β)A, (11)
where A = (a−γc)/(5−6β +2β2). Accordingly, the number of permits sold in
period 2 is given by
qP
2 =
3 − 5β + 2β2
2 − β
A. (12)
The respective permit prices are
pP
2 = a −
7 − 9β + 3β2
2 − β
A
in period 2 and
pP
1 = 2a −
11 − 13β + 4β2
2 − β
A
in period 1. The Government’s overall revenue from the sale of permits, given
by TP(q) = p1q1 + p2q2, then is
TP =
a(9 − 21β + 16β2 − 4β3) + (13 − 16β + 5β2)γc
(2 − β)
2 A, (13)
12The necessary re-arrangements are demonstrated in the Appendix.
6while the total costs of pollution are
CP = (2q1 + q2)c =
11 − 13β + 4β2
2 − β
cA. (14)
Total welfare is given by WP = B1 + B2 − CP or
WP =




The Government’s net payoﬀ from selling permits as durable goods is given by
ΠP = TP + β(B1 + B2 − TP) − γCP, or
ΠP =
(9 − 10β + 3β2)(a − γc)
2(2 − β)
A. (16)
3 Leasing of Permits: Pollution Taxes
Permit sales usually grant pollution rights, if not forever, at least for a number
of periods. Another way of implementing pollution control is to tax emissions.
Conceptually, a pollution tax can be thought of as the equivalent to a leasing fee
for the right to pollute. If the Government would decide to lease out pollution
rights for just one period instead of selling them, then its optimal leasing fee
would be just the same as the optimal pollution tax, at least in our model of
complete and certain information and without innovation.
As we know from Coase (1972), leasing can be one way to overcome the durable
good monopolist’s time-inconsistency problem described above. As tax rates or
leasing fees are set for one period of time, ﬁrms do not have to take into account
the future value of their pollution rights, because they are valid for one period
only, when deciding about their output and thereby about the level of pollution.
A leasing arrangement separates the demand for pollution over the two periods.
In each period, the inverse demand function is given through the marginal ben-




Π = pt(qt)qt + βNt(qt) − γcqt (17)
for both t = 1 and t = 2. Solving for the ﬁrst-oder condition we obtain the
optimal leasing quantity, qL






Accordingly, the leasing fee or pollution tax rate is given by
pL
t =
(1 − β)a + γc
2 − β
, (19)
7and the Government’s overall revenue from taxing pollution (i.e., leasing out
pollution rights) is
TL =
2((1 − β)a + γc)(a − γc)
(2 − β)2 , (20)





Total welfare under the tax or leasing system amounts to
WL = (a − γc)
(3 − 2β)a − (4 − 2β − γ)c
(2 − β)
2 , (22)






4 Incentives for Diﬀerent Types of Government
4.1 Evaluation of the General Model
In the general model, which we have presented in the previous section, the Gov-
ernment pursues both budget and welfare objectives. This type of Government
is comparable with Williamson’s (1963) model of discretionary managerial be-
havior, where a ﬁrm’s managers use their discretion to pursue both the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt (here: welfare) and their own perks (here: tax revenues). Let us now
analyze the welfare eﬀects of durable permit sales and annual permit leases
(pollution taxes) as well as the Government’s general incentives for choosing
one or the other policy instrument.
4.1.1 Welfare
We start with the analysis of the social welfare impacts of the two policy instru-
ments. A durable permit system can be welfare superior compared to a leasing
or tax system because durable permits pose a time-consistency or credibility
problem for the Government which in fact leads in fact to a welfare improve-
ment. This is due to the additional permits the Government is tempted to
issue in period 2, which reduce the welfare loss from monopoly. As a pollution
tax overcomes the Government’s credibility problem, it simultaneously reduces
product market eﬃciency as it implements the monopoly outcome.
Social welfare is given by total product market beneﬁts net of the total cost of
pollution: WS = BS − CS, where the superscript S ∈ {P;L} represents the
durable permit system (S = P) or the leasing system (S = L). As introduced
8above, for any β and γ the Government’s objective function is given by equation
(4).
Comparing equations (15) and (22), note that social welfare is lower under
a leasing (or pollution tax) system than with a durable-good permit sale if
WP > WL or, equivalently:
a − c
c
(1 − β)2 > (3 − β)(1 − β)(1 − γ) (24)
Recall that a > c > 0 and β,γ ∈ [0,1]. For given values of a,c and γ, the
parameter β has the following impact on the above condition: For β = 1 both
the left- and the right-hand side of condition (24) reduce to 0; hence, there is no
welfare diﬀerence between permit sales and a tax (leasing) system. For β < 1,




(3 − β)(1 − γ)
1 − β
. (25)
For γ < 1 the right-hand side of the above expression is increasing in β; thus
condition (24) is more likely to hold the lower the Government’s product market
concern. The right-hand side of condition (24) is also decreasing in γ, and for
γ = 1 the condition is obviously always fulﬁlled (for a > c). Thus, a permit
system is the more likely to be welfare superior the larger the Government’s en-
vironmental concern and the less it is concerned about product market beneﬁts.
Accordingly, a pollution tax or leasing system can only be welfare superior if β
is suﬃciently large or γ suﬃciently small. Since a higher β means that the Gov-
ernment puts more emphasis on product market outcomes, the Government’s
inability to credibly commit to the level of pollution with a durable permit
system may reduce welfare if the social costs of pollution are suﬃciently high.
4.1.2 Government’s incentives
Apart from their welfare implications, it is of interest which of the policy in-
struments is preferred by the Government. Its policy choice is determined by
its payoﬀ function. Comparing the Government’s payoﬀ under the two systems
(equations (16) and (23)), we ﬁnd that a pollution tax or leasing system will
never lead to a smaller payoﬀ for the Government than a regime with permit
sales, i.e ΠP ≤ ΠL always holds.
Two cases are to be distinguished: ΠL > ΠP and ΠP = ΠL. ΠP > ΠL is
equivalent to
9 − 10β + 3β2









which can be reduced to 9 − 10β + 3β2 < 10 − 12β + 4β2. This is equivalent to
2β < 1+β2 or (1−β)2 > 0. This condition holds for all β < 1, while for β = 1
we obtain ΠP = ΠL.
9To summarize, a Government with β < 1 will always strictly prefer a leasing/tax
system over permit sales, while a Government with β = 1 is indiﬀerent between
the two policy instruments. No Government with β ≤ 0 will ever prefer permit
sales over pollution taxes.
4.2 Four Stylized Types of Government
As special cases of the general model outlined above, we want to distinguish
four types of government:13
1. a benevolent dictator, whose objective is to maximize social welfare, re-
gardless of the collected budget. In our model, this type is parameterized
as β = 1, γ = 1.
2. a pure Leviathan type of Government, which is only concerned with tax
revenues (β = 0, γ = 0).
3. a green Government, which is interested in both tax revenues and pollution
(β = 0, γ = 1);14 and
4. a business friendly Government, which is not only interested in tax rev-
enues, but also shares product market concerns (β = 1, γ = 0).
For each type of Government, we will now derive equilibrium prices and quanti-
ties as well as Government revenues, total pollution costs, and social welfare for
both permit sales and leasing (taxes) under the various types of Government.
These ﬁgures allow us to compare the two policy instruments under diﬀerent
types of Governments, as we can measure social welfare and/or environmental
outcomes. Furthermore, the Government’s payoﬀ function should tell us which
policy instrument would be preferred by a given type of Government. Thereby,
we can endogenously explain the choice of environmental policy from a political
economy point of view.
4.2.1 A Benevolent Dictator: β = 1,γ = 1
Using the model from the previous section and inserting β = 1 and γ = 1
into the respective formulas, it is straightforward that social welfare, i.e. total
product market beneﬁts less total pollution costs (B − C), is maximized by
setting the permit price equal to the marginal cost of pollution: pP
1 = 2c. The
quantity sold in period 1 is qP
1 = (a − c), and there are no additional permits
sold in period 2.
Alternatively, a benevolent social planner could set the pollution tax rate at
pt = c. In both cases, total pollution amounts to C = 2(a − c)c, which equals
13As explained above, the model would also allow us to analyze cases beyond β,γ ∈ {0;1}.
However, we feel that this would unnecessarily complicate the exposition of results.
14The case of a Government that is only interested in reducing pollution costs leads to a
rather trivial result: its optimal choice would be qt = 0.
10the amount of Government revenues, i.e. T = C = 2(a − c)c. Total welfare is
W = B1 + B2 − C, which equals (a − c)2.
Table 1: Results under a Benevolent Social Planner (β = 1,γ = 1)
Policy instrument S P L
Government’s revenues TS 2(a − c)c 2(a − c)c
Pollution costs CS 2(a − c)c 2(a − c)c
Total welfare WS (a − c)2 (a − c)2
Government’s payoﬀ ΠS (a − c)2 (a − c)2
4.2.2 A Pure Leviathan Government: β = 0,γ = 0
In the general model, it was assumed that the Government is partially benev-
olent in the sense that it cares about product market beneﬁts and also gives
weight to the social cost of pollution when making its decisions. However, it
has been sometimes argued that a green or pollution tax is not really promot-
ing environmental goals, but rather an attempt to raise revenues.15 Hence, let
us brieﬂy explore what happens if both the costs of pollution and the beneﬁts
raised on the product market are external to the Government’s objective func-
tion and, therefore, do not enter into the Government’s decision making. This
kind of Government only cares for monetary revenues.16
As can be easily veriﬁed from (11) to (16), under a permit selling regime the
revenue maximizing Government will sell qP
1 = 0.4a permits in period 1 at a
price of pP
1 = 0.9a and another qP
2 = 0.3a permits in period 2 for pP
2 = 0.3a.
Total Government revenues accrue to TP = 0.45a2, which equals the Leviathan
Government’s payoﬀ ΠP. The social costs of pollution are CP = 1.1ac, and
total welfare is given by WP = 0.775a2 − 1.1ac.
If the Leviathan Government uses a pollution tax, its revenue maximizing leasing
charge is pL
t = 0.5a, and the leased quantity is qL
t = 0.5a in each period.
Government revenues under the leasing model are TL = 0.5a2, which is also the
Government’s payoﬀ ΠL. Pollution costs amount to CL = ac, and total welfare
is WL = 0.75a2 − ac (see (18) to (23)).
The comparison these results, as summarized in Table 2, reveals that under a
pure Leviathan Government a tax or leasing system may actually be welfare
superior when compared to a durable permit sale. More speciﬁcally, this is the
case for a < 4c,17 i.e. if the costs of pollution are suﬃciently high or the market
for the good whose production causes the pollution is relatively small. If, on
15See, e.g., Schneider (1999, 27).
16The Leviathan is a representative of the traditional, proﬁt maximizing durable-good mo-
nopolist that has been analyzed in the literature so far, see Rasmusen (1991, 276) or Coase
(1972).
17The same result can be derived from condition (24).
11Table 2: Results under a Leviathan Government (β = 0,γ = 0)
Policy instrument S P L
Government’s revenues TS 0.45a2 0.5a2
Pollution costs CS 1.1ac ac
Total welfare WS 0.775a2 − 1.1ac 0.75a2 − ac
Government’s payoﬀ ΠS 0.45a2 0.5a2
the other hand, the costs of pollution are relatively low or if the demand on the
respective product market is relatively large (a > 4c), a permit system results
in higher welfare than a pollution tax.
In both cases, however, the Leviathan Government prefers the leasing solution,
since ΠL > ΠP. Hence, if the social cost of pollution is not too high, the
Government’s preferred policy instrument (a tax or leasing charge) is suboptimal
from a welfare point of view. The Leviathan Government’s tax regime also leads
to less pollution than the durable permit system (CL < CP), even though the
Leviathan Government does not pursue environmental goals. The leasing or
pollution tax solution provides higher revenues: TL > TP.
4.2.3 A Green Government: β = 0,γ = 1
A Green Government is interested in both tax revenues and pollution costs.
The easiest way to parameterize this type of Government is setting β = 0 and
γ = 1.18 The green Government’s objective function hence is ΠS = TS − CS,
where S ∈ {P;L} represents either the durable permit system (S = P) or the
leasing system (S = L).
Under a durable permit system, a Green Government sells qP
1 = 0.4(a − c)
licenses for pP
1 = 0.9a+1.1c in Period 1. In the second period, the quantity sold
is qP
2 = 0.3(a−c) at a price of pP
2 = 0.3a+0.7c. Hence, the Government collects
TP = 0.45a2+0.2ac−0.65c2. The total cost of pollution then is CP = 1.1c(a−c),
and the total welfare accrues to WP = 0.775(a−c)2. The Government’s payoﬀ
is ΠP = 0.45(a − c)2.
Under a leasing or tax system, the Green Government would sell qL
t = 0.5(a−c)
at a price of pL
t = 0.5(a+c) in both periods. Thereby, it collects TL = 0.5(a2 −
c2). This leads to pollution costs of CL = c(a − c), and total welfare is WL =
0.75(a − c)2. The Government’s payoﬀ then is ΠL = 0.5(a − c)2.
These results are summarized in Table 3. The durable permit system is welfare
superior (WP > WL). However, we expect a green Government to prefer a
leasing or pollution tax system, since ΠL > ΠP.19
18While we could also derive results for more complicated cases with γ 6= 1, we feel the
additional insight we gain from this exercise is rather limited.
19Also note that tax revenues are always larger under a Green Government’s permit sale
than under a green tax system. TP ≥ TL holds as long as a ≥ c, which must hold for a
12Table 3: Results under a Green Government (β = 0,γ = 1)
Policy instrument S P L
Government’s revenues TS 0.45a2 + 0.2ac − 0.65c2 0.5(a2 − c2)
Pollution costs CS 1.1c(a − c) c(a − c)
Total welfare WS 0.775(a − c)2 0.75(a − c)2
Government’s payoﬀ ΠS 0.45(a − c)2 0.5(a − c)2
Figure 1 demonstrates the diﬀerent pollution levels under a Green Government’s
pollution tax system. The upper diagonal line represents the marginal utility
of pollution, R(q) = a − q, and the lower diagonal line represents the marginal
increase in Government revenues (a−2q). The ﬁrms choose q0 if the Government
fails to take any action, i.e. sets a zero price for pollution rights.From a social
welfare point of view the optimal pollution level is reached at q∗; the marginal
utility of pollution R(q∗) equals the pollution cost c. Hence, q0 is clearly too
high.
However, the Government’s budget-orientation induces it, as the monopoly sup-
plier, to charge too high a price for pollution rights, as shown in the sections
above. If the Green Government (with γ = 1) introduces a leasing system, it
sets the monopoly price where marginal revenues equal pollution costs. If the
green government would sell durable permits instead of charging a pollution
tax, the average amount of pollution per period 20 would be qP = 1.1qL, which
is still suboptimal low, but at least the welfare loss is smaller than under the
leasing system. In Figure 1, social welfare is represented by the diﬀerence of the
R-line and the c-line. Compared to the socially optimal pollution level, q∗, the
welfare loss caused by the durable permit system is the small triangle between
q∗ and qP, labeled as 1. The additional welfare loss of a pollution tax system is
the square between qL and qP, labeled as 2.
4.2.4 A Business-friendly Government: β = 1,γ = 0
A business-friendly Government can be characterized by the parameter con-
stellation β = 1 and γ = 0, as we assume that the Government is primarily
interested in product market beneﬁts,21 while neglecting the social cost of pol-
lution. While for such a Government, permits are nothing but a source of
income, the Government is still concerned about product market performance
which contrasts with the pure Leviathan Government. The Government’s ob-
product market to bring social beneﬁts at all. From a ≥ c it follows that a2 − 4ac + 3c2 ≤ 0,
which implies TP ≥ TL.
20The average pollution amount qP, as indicated in ﬁgure 1, equals 0.5(2qP
1 + qP
2 ).
21Note that in our model all product market beneﬁts will accrue to consumers if ﬁrms
compete in Bertrand fashion. In this case, our entire analysis does never contain a double-
marginalisation problem.
























































jective function now is ΠS = TS + NS = BS, S ∈ {P;L}.
Under a durable permit system (S = P), the Government oﬀers qP
1 = a permits
for a price of zero (pP
1 = 0) in the ﬁrst period, and no further permits in the
second period (qP
2 = 0, pP
2 = 0). Obviously there are no Government revenues
(TP = 0) whereas the total pollution costs are CP = 2ac. Total welfare accrues
to WP = a2 − 2ac, and the Government’s payoﬀ is ΠP = a2. The same results
hold for the tax or leasing system.
These results are summarized in Table 4.
4.3 Welfare Comparison for the Stylized Types
Now that we have derived the outcome for the four diﬀerent types of Govern-
ment (benevolent, Leviathan, green, and business-friendly) and for two diﬀerent
policy instruments which determine how the Government assigns the pollution
14Table 4: Results under a Product Market-oriented Government (β = 1,γ = 0)
Policy instrument S P L
Government’s revenues TS 0 0
Pollution costs CS 2ac 2ac
Total welfare WS a2 − 2ac a2 − 2ac
Government’s payoﬀ ΠS a2 a2
rights (durable permits vs. leasing as an equivalent to a pollution taxes), let us
compare our results in a comprehensive manner.
Durable permits lead, under all of the Government types, to higher or equal
emission level than a leasing or tax solution; therefore, total pollution costs un-
der the permit system exceed the pollution costs under a tax or leasing regime.
This diﬀerence would amount to 10 percent under a green or Leviathan Govern-
ment. The level of pollution is, however, still suboptimal with both a Leviathan
and a green Government when compared to the social welfare maximizing level
as given in Table 1, while pollution is too high with a business friendly Govern-
ment which grants pollution rights for free or does not tax pollution.
Another welfare comparison can be performed between the four types of Govern-
ment. All of them prefer (at least weakly) the leasing solution. Given this policy
choice, which type of Government is the one that best promotes social welfare?
That is: Under which Government is WL highest? The natural candidate for
the top position is the benevolent Government. If we omit this trivial option,
then we limit our view to the candidates for a second-best Government system.
The comparison of WL
t ,t ∈ {b,g,l} (where b stands for business-friendly, g for
green, l for Leviathan) yields the following insights:
• A business friendly Government is welfare superior to a Leviathan Gov-
ernment (WL
b > WL
l ) if a > 4c.
• A business friendly Government is welfare superior to a green Government
(WL
b > WL
g ) if a > 3c; and
• A Leviathan Government is welfare superior to a green Government (WL
l >
WL
g ) if a > 1.5c.
Figure 2 demonstrates these results. For a > c, this ﬁgure distinguishes the four
relevant cases (while the worst of the Government types is omitted respectively):
• a < 1.5c: The green Government is second best, followed by the Leviathan,
with the business friendly Government in the last position.
• 1.5c < a < 3c: Leviathan is second best, then green, then business-
friendly.
15Figure 2: Welfare comparison between second-best Government types
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• 3c < a < 4c: Leviathan is second best, then business-friendly, then green.
• a > 4c: Now the business-friendly government is second best, followed by
the Leviathan, ﬁnally the green Government.
Hence, a green Government is the second-best type of Government in welfare
terms if a < 1.5c, which may be the case if the cost of pollution is relatively high
or the product market concerned relatively small. For 4c < a < 1.5c a Levithan
Government is preferable, while for a > 4c a business friendly Government
brings the highest welfare of these three types of Government.
5 Policy Implications and Conclusion
All of the Government types we have analyzed in the previous section (namely
the Leviathan, the Green Government and the business-friendly one) prefer a
leasing or pollution tax regime over durable permit sales in our model. For the
Leviathan, this result is far from being counterintuitive, since the monopoly
power secured by the leasing system provides higher revenues. Whereas the
impact of leasing (instead of durable permit sales) on pollution cost and revenues
are ambiguous with a Green Government, the leasing regime clearly provides a
higher payoﬀ to the Government.
Environmental policy based on durable pollution permits can yet be welfare
superior to a pollution tax. This is caused by the credibility problem a revenue
maximizing Government faces. This credibility problem weakens the Govern-
ment’s ability to commit to the monopoly quantity in the long run. Thereby,
durable permits can reduce the allocative ineﬃciency induced by a monopolis-
tic, revenue maximizing Government. In contrast, a pollution tax or leasing
charge allows the Government to credibly commit not to alter the allowed level
of pollution in the future in order to raise additional revenues.
In fact, a pollution tax or leasing charge may align the Government’s ﬁscal and
environmental objectives in the long run, as a durable permit system leads to
both lower Government revenues and higher levels of pollution when compared
to a pollution tax or leasing regime.
16While a pollution tax regime may be better for the environment and for the
Government’s revenues, we have shown that it is harmful for overall welfare
if the Government also has a revenue objective. In fact, from a social wel-
fare perspective it may be desirable that the Government cannot commit to
monopoly quantities. Or to put it diﬀerently, it may be desirable to introduce
constitutional constraints on the choice of environmental policy instruments.22
Our argument for a permit regime is completely diﬀerent, however, from more
traditional arguments favoring tradable permit regimes which are usually based
on information asymmetries and innovation incentives.
To be provocative, the recent Kyoto protocol may, in light of the above results,
be seen as a monopolistic attempt to ﬁx quantities in order to achieve monopoly
outcomes, as international treaties and international law may provide another
commitment device which we have not explored in this paper.
Finally, the above model may also help to explain from a political economy point
of view why many diﬀerent types of Governments appear to favor pollution taxes
over permit regimes. A tax system may simply generate higher Government
revenues than pollution permits in the long run, as it serves as a commitment
device for a proﬁt maximizing monopolist.
22The idea that the politicians’ power should be limited through constitutional constraints
on the choice of policy instruments has also been put forward by Boyer and Laﬀont (1999) in a
model where politicians have private information about the true cost of some policy measure.
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19Appendix
Re-arrangements for equation (11)
The Government’s payoﬀ function is T +βN−γC. Substituting T = q1p1+q2p2
and N = B − T yields
max
q1
p1q1 + p2q2 + β[(B1(q1) − p1q1) + (B2(q1,q2) − p2q2)] − γ(2q1 + q2)c
Substitution of q2 = qP
2 (q1), p2 = pP
2 (q1) and p1 = pP
1 (q1) leads to the following
expression:
(3 − 2β)(a − q1) + γc
2 − β
q1 +
(1 − β)(a − q1) + γc
2 − β
a − q1 − γc
2 − β
+β[(B1(q1) −




(1 − β)(a − q1] + γc
2 − β
a − q1 − γc
2 − β
)] − γ(2q1 +
a − q1 − γc
2 − β
)c
Substitution of B1 then leads to
(3 − 2β)(a − q1) + γc
2 − β
q1 +
(1 − β)(a − q1) + γc
2 − β

















(1 − β)(a − q1) + γc
2 − β




a − q1 − γc
2 − β
)c
which is to be maximized. The derivative with respect to q1 of the latter ex-
pression is
−
10q1 + 4γc − 4a + 5aβ − 12q1β − 5γcβ − 2aβ2 + 4q1β2 + 2γcβ2
(−2 + β)
2
+(4β − 4β2 + β3)
5q1 − γc + a − aβ − 6q1β + γcβ + 2q1β2
(−2 + β)
4
Setting this equal to zero yields
q1 = (2 − β)
a − γc
5 − 6β + 2β2 = (2 − β)A
as the solution, see equation (11).
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